

TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS 2004

A PROJECT OF THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPAGNIA DI SAN PAOLO
WITH ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FROM THE LUSO-AMERICAN FOUNDATION, FUNDACIÓN BBVA,
AND THE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (IVO)

Transatlantic Trends 2004 Partners

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Methodology: : EOS Gallup Europe was commissioned to conduct the survey by telephone interviews using CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) in all countries except Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey, where lower telephone penetration necessitates face-to-face interviews. Interviews were conducted between June 6, 2004 and June 24, 2004. In all countries, a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed. For results based on the total national sample in each of the 11 countries, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is either plus or minus 3 percentage points. The average response rate for the eleven countries surveyed was 23.6%.

Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each of the countries surveyed. Europe-7 (E7) includes the seven European countries that were surveyed in Transatlantic Trends 2003 (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and United Kingdom). Europe-9 (E9) includes these same seven countries plus Spain and Slovakia, which along with Turkey have been included in Transatlantic Trends for the first time this year. Comparative data listed in brackets comes from Transatlantic Trends 2003, undertaken by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from Fundaçao Luso-Americana, and from Worldviews 2002, undertaken by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Note to the reader: In order to discuss European-wide trends we needed to compare this year's European-wide results with the results from previous years. This presented a methodological challenge, as we first needed to reconcile the discrepancy between the number of countries included in this year's survey with the number of countries included in years past. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle we compared the 2004 E7 results to the 2004 E9 results. When we did this we found that for all questions asked the difference between the two sets of results was always less then or equal to 3 percentage points. Therefore, we decided that for the purposes of this report it would be acceptable to compare the 2004 E9 results with the 2003 E7 results, thus allowing us to discuss European-wide trends.

Finally, it should be noted that while our discussion of European trends often excludes the Turkish results, this was done strictly out of a desire for clarity of analysis and is in no way intended to comment on whether Turkey should or will become a part of the European Union.

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
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TRANSATLANTIC
TRENDS 2004

Key Findings

After the intense debates and disagreements of the past three years, the transatlantic community is divided. While Americans and Europeans have similar threat perceptions, they differ markedly on how best to deal with these threats and under what aegis. One result of this division is that many Europeans, while wanting to cooperate with the United States, also want to play a more independent role in the world. By contrast, Americans seek a closer partnership with a strong European Union even if it would not always agree with U.S. perceptions or prescriptions. However, as in past years, Europeans are ambivalent about what kind of global role they should play and at what cost. If these conditions are permanent, they promise to fundamentally transform the nature of transatlantic relations.

These findings are part of *Transatlantic Trends*, a comprehensive survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted in the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and, for the first time, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey. The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from the Luso-American Foundation, Fundacion BBVA, and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO).

Key findings of this survey include:

- European support for strong American leadership in the world has declined significantly over the past two years, as has approval of President George Bush's international policies. But support among Europeans for a stronger EU role in the world predates this decline in support for U.S. leadership, suggesting that other factors are at work in Europeans' desire for greater independence as well.
- Europeans and a narrow majority of Americans believe that the Iraq war was not worth the costs. However, European disapproval increased only modestly over the previous year.
- Most Americans want to maintain a close partnership with Europe and support a stronger European partner to help manage global challenges.
- While seeking a cooperative relationship with the United States, Europeans increasingly want the European Union to develop into a superpower that can act independently of the United States in world affairs, but many are unwilling to spend more on defense in order to realize that ambition.
- Despite a transatlantic consensus on international threats, there are sharp divisions over when to use force and under what auspices. Although willing to use force in certain scenarios, Europeans are much less willing to use force to maintain peace or obtain justice, and they are broadly unwilling to use force without multilateral approval. The transatlantic split on these issues is substantial, but so are the divisions within the United States and Europe.

- While support for the United Nations as an institution remains high in the United States and Europe, a majority of Americans and majorities or pluralities in many European countries would bypass the UN when vital interests are at stake.
- Most Europeans do not believe the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life and other costs of attacking Iraq, and believe the war increased the risk of terrorism. Americans are divided sharply along partisan and ideological lines.
- Despite their governments' opposition to deploying troops to Iraq, clear majorities in France, Germany, and Spain would back their country's participation in a UN-mandated peacekeeping force in Iraq.
- While there are clear "European" positions on a number of issues, there are also significant disagreements among countries on many questions, including the desirability of U.S. leadership, the depth of support for an EU superpower, Turkish membership in the EU, the use of force, and the value of military power.
- Turkey was included in this study for the first time in 2004. In the lead-up to a decision on Turkey's membership in the European Union, Turkish respondents demonstrated strong support for accession. But they are ambivalent about the EU's global role and their attitudes on the use of force more closely resemble the American position.
- American public opinion on many issues is polarized. There are sharp splits on President Bush, the war in Iraq, the role of the UN, and the justification for using military force. While some of these divisions are no doubt the result of election-year rhetoric, they may also reflect a more fundamental split in the way Republicans and Democrats view the U.S. role in the world.

The Transatlantic Relationship One Year After Iraq

This year's survey results may reveal a basic shift in the transatlantic relationship. While Americans show increased interest in working closely with a strong and effective European ally, a growing number of Europeans want to play a more independent role in a world where U.S. leadership is less omnipresent. European opinion is divided over whether or not a more independent role is worth—or even requires—additional military spending. Yet, even amongst those who are most supportive of a stronger European profile, most also want greater cooperation between the United States and Europe. Nonetheless, these and other indicators suggest that the events of the past two years may have fundamentally altered the nature of the alliance.

European feelings toward U.S. have not grown colder.

Most Europeans hold moderately favorable feelings towards the United States. As a whole, Europeans gave the United States a thermometer reading of 55 on a scale of 1–100. This represents no change over last year, signifying that Europeans have not developed less favorable feelings towards the United States over the past year, although neither have their feelings grown warmer. Americans gave France a thermometer reading of 51, a decline of 4 degrees since 2002, but an increase of 6 degrees since 2003. Americans gave Germany a thermometer reading of 61 degrees, the same as in 2002 and an increase of 5 degrees since 2003. Americans gave the EU a thermometer reading of 62 degrees, higher than they rated either France or Germany and an increase of 9 degrees since 2002. *See Chart 1.*

Majorities in U.S. and Europe believe we share common values.

Americans (71%) and Europeans (60%) retain broad consensus that the United States and the European Union have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international problems.

Americans desire closer partnership with EU while Europeans support more independent approach.

Sixty percent of Americans believe that the partnership between the United States and the EU should become closer, but 50% of Europeans believe the EU should take a more independent approach in security and diplomatic affairs. Majorities in the United Kingdom and Poland want the EU and the U.S. to become closer or remain as close, with Spain nearly evenly divided. Majorities or pluralities in other countries support a more independent EU approach. *See Chart 2.*




Chart 1

MOST AMERICANS FAVOR STRONG EU LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS; MANY EUROPEANS FIND STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP UNDESIRABLE.

Seventy-nine percent of Americans find it desirable for the European Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs. Yet, in all countries but Italy, support for American leadership is at its lowest point since at least 1997. At the time that the survey was conducted, 58% of Europeans, 9 percentage point more than last year, found strong U.S. leadership undesirable. Support in Europe for strong U.S. leadership also declined significantly after the Kosovo war in 1999, with support then dropping to only 36% in Italy and 47% in Germany.[1] *See Chart 3.*

[1] Source: Data from before 2002 comes from surveys conducted by the Office of Research, United States Department of State

EUROPEANS FAVOR EU SUPERPOWER.

Most Europeans (71%) believe the EU should become a superpower like the U.S., a figure unchanged from last year, but an increase of 6 percentage points since 2002. Support for an EU superpower has increased by 25 percentage points since 2002 in Germany (with most change occurring between 2002 and 2003), but has declined since last year in France, Italy, and Portugal. At the same time, when those Europeans who favor an EU superpower were asked if they would favor it even if it required higher levels of military spending, nearly half (47%) withdrew their support.




Chart 2




Chart 3

Europeans want more military power to protect own interests, but not more defense spending.

Sixty-four percent of Europeans believe Europe should acquire more military power to be able to protect its interests separately from the U.S. Yet only 22% of Europeans believe their governments should be spending more on defense. Whether this demonstrates ambivalence or belief in other ways of building up military power remains to be explored. *See Charts 4 and 5.*

Europeans support EU superpower to cooperate, rather than compete with, U.S.

Among Europeans who favor an EU superpower, 63% believe it is desirable because it would be able to cooperate more effectively with the United States. Only 30% of Europeans support an EU superpower in order to compete more effectively with the United States. *See Chart 6.*

Transatlantic consensus on importance of domestic issues masks transatlantic divide over importance of foreign and security policy to voters.

Americans (58%) and Europeans (75%) agree that how a political party handles economic and domestic policy issues is most important in determining how they will vote in the next election. However, 32% of Americans indicate that the way a party handles foreign and security policy and terrorism will be most important in determining their vote, compared with only 11% of Europeans. This suggests a clear, if possibly temporary, transatlantic divide over the saliency of foreign and security policy and terrorism to voters in Europe and the United States.




Chart 4




Chart 5




Chart 6

Transatlantic community divided over President Bush's international policies.

Fifty-one percent of Americans approve of the way President Bush is handling international policies, and 47% disapprove. Seventy-six percent of Europeans disapprove, an increase of 12 percentage points since 2003 and 20 percentage points since 2002.

Nevertheless, transatlantic majorities do not believe Europe and U.S. have grown farther apart.

Despite controversy over American foreign policy, 65% of Europeans believe that Europe and the United States have grown closer or remained about the same in recent years; only minorities in every country believe we have grown farther apart. The number of Europeans who believe that the United States and Europe have grown farther apart declined from 36% in 2003 to 31% in 2004, with declines in every country for which we have trend data except France. Americans are more likely than Europeans to perceive a growing estrangement.

U.S.-European Attitudes Toward Threats, Legitimacy, and the Use of Force

How Americans and Europeans perceive threats, and the circumstances under which they are prepared to use military force in response to those threats, are central questions for transatlantic relations in a dangerous world. Americans and Europeans agree broadly on the nature of international threats, and show general consensus on using force to meet them. Yet, separate from any specific issues raised by the Iraq war, they strongly disagree on using force in the absence of a multilateral mandate.

Americans and Europeans agree on the big threats facing their societies.

Americans and Europeans broadly agree on the threat posed by international terrorism, a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction, military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the global spread of diseases such as AIDS, a major economic downturn, Islamic fundamentalism, and large immigrant and refugee flows. *See Chart 7.*

Americans more willing to use force to meet traditional threats, while Europeans more willing to undertake humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

Americans and Europeans agree generally on the situations that require the use of military force. However, relative to Europeans, a higher percentage of Americans supports using force to prevent a terrorist attack, stop nuclear proliferation, defend a NATO ally, and remove a government that abuses human rights. Relative to Americans, a higher percentage of Europeans supports using military force to meet such challenges as providing food and medical assistance to victims of war, stop fighting in a civil war, and provide peacekeeping troops after a civil war has ended.

Most Americans would bypass UN on vital interests.

When asked if it is justified to bypass the United Nations when the vital interests of their country are involved, 59% of Americans agreed, including 36% who agreed strongly. Forty-four percent of Europeans agreed. However, majorities in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Slovakia agreed strongly or somewhat with this statement, as did pluralities in Poland and Portugal. Since 2003, support for bypassing the UN increased in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. *See Chart 8.*

Americans and Europeans divided on necessity of military force to achieve justice.

Fifty-four percent of Americans agree with the proposition that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength, compared with only 28% of Europeans. Eighty-two percent of Americans believe that under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice, compared with only 41% of Europeans.




Chart 7

EUROPEANS AND NARROW MAJORITY OF AMERICANS BELIEVE IRAQ WAR NOT WORTH THE COSTS.

Eighty percent of Europeans do not believe the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life and the other costs of attacking Iraq, an increase of 10% over last year. Americans are divided: 44% believe the war was worth the costs, compared with 55% last year, and 50% do not, compared with 36% last year.

EUROPEANS BELIEVE IRAQ WAR INCREASED THREAT OF TERRORISM, AMERICANS DIVIDED.

Seventy-three percent of Europeans believe the war in Iraq increased the threat of terrorism around the world. Forty-nine percent of Americans agree, while 26% believe it has decreased the threat and 20% believe it has had no effect.




Chart 8

Majorities in France, Germany, and Spain would approve sending troops to Iraq with a UN mandate.

Strong majorities in France (93%) and Germany (89%) support their government's decision not to send troops to Iraq, and a majority in Spain (74%) supports their government's decision to withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq. Yet majorities in France (63%), Germany (57%), and Spain (66%)—each a leading critic of U.S. policy in Iraq—would support deploying their country's military forces to Iraq if the United Nations approved a multinational force to assist with security and reconstruction in Iraq. Support in each country falls if such a multinational force were to be under U.S. command. Nonetheless, given the bad news coming from Iraq just before this polling began, and the opposition to the war in Iraq by many leading politicians, it is striking that public support in Germany, France, and Spain for deploying troops in Iraq under UN auspices remained relatively high. *See Chart 9.*

Americans support troop presence in Iraq; Europeans divided, but support in some countries resilient.

Fifty-seven percent of Americans approve of the presence of American troops in Iraq. In Europe, the picture is mixed. A majority of respondents in the Netherlands (58%) approve, while majorities in Portugal (65%), Slovakia (71%), and Poland (73%) disapprove. Italy and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, are more or less evenly divided on this question. Asked if they would support keeping their country's troops in Iraq if the UN approved a multinational force under U.S. command, European opinion remained surprisingly supportive despite a very difficult spring in Iraq. Sixty-four percent of British, 63% of Dutch, 52% of Italians, and 50% of Portuguese approved of keeping their forces deployed there under a UN mandate.




Chart 9

AMERICANS, MANY EUROPEANS SUPPORT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN.

Among nations with troops stationed in Afghanistan, 69% of Americans and 52% of Europeans (E7) support the presence of their country's troops there. In Europe, majorities in the Netherlands (66%), Germany (59%), Italy (56%), France (55%), and the United Kingdom (50%) support the mission, as does a plurality in Spain (48%). By contrast, only 41% of Portuguese and 24% of Poles support the presence of their forces in Afghanistan. *See Chart 10.*




Chart 10

Americans and Europeans believe international mandate for Iraq-type operation in future to be essential.

Majorities in Europe and the United States believe it would be essential to secure international approval before using military force if a situation like Iraq were to arise in the future. Eighty-two percent of Europeans believe UN approval would be essential, 80% think approval of the main European allies would be essential, and 72% think NATO's approval would be essential. For Americans, the approval of the main European allies provides a higher degree of legitimacy for the use of military force than the approval of either the UN or NATO. *See Chart 11.*




Chart 11

Military Force: The Great European Divider

On a range of issues, a broad European consensus exists and is apparent when juxtaposed against views in the United States. However, this survey also demonstrates that Europe is far from united on some important challenges. The most acute differences, within and between countries, emerge over when and under what conditions to use military force.

Europeans divided on desirability of U.S. leadership in world affairs.

Majorities in the United Kingdom (54%) and the Netherlands (59%) believe it is very or somewhat desirable for the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs, whereas majorities in Spain (76%), France (73%), Slovakia (68%), Germany (60%), and Italy (56%) believe that strong American leadership is somewhat or very undesirable.

Europeans divided over EU superpower if it requires greater defense expenditures.

Seventy-one percent of Europeans believe the EU should become a superpower like the United States. However, if superpower status required greater military expenditure, 47% of Europeans would withdraw their support. *See Chart 12.*

Sharp disagreements on Afghanistan, Iraq.

Among European countries with forces stationed in Afghanistan, approval of their deployment ranges from 24% in Poland to 59% in Germany and 66% in the Netherlands. Among European countries with forces stationed in Iraq, approval of their deployment ranges from 24% in Poland to 58% in the Netherlands. *See Chart 13.*

Division over necessity of war to obtain justice.

When asked to agree or disagree with the assertion that, under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice, agreement across Europe ranged from 25% in Spain to 69% in the United Kingdom. See Chart 14.

Divergent views within and across Europe on legitimacy of bypassing UN.

As a whole, Europeans are divided over whether it is justified to bypass the UN when the vital interests of their country are at stake. Forty-four percent of Europeans agree that bypassing the UN would be justified, and 49% disagree. Differences of opinion are also clear between European countries, with support for bypassing the UN ranging from 37% in Italy and 38% in Spain to 51% in the United Kingdom and 58% in the Netherlands.




Chart 12




Chart 13

EUROPEANS DIVIDED OVER UTILITY OF MILITARY ACTION TO FIGHT TERRORISM.

As a whole, Europeans are almost evenly split over whether military action to eliminate terrorist organizations is the most appropriate way to fight terrorism—49% agree and 47% disagree, with some countries closely divided internally. There are also clear differences between countries, with those who disagree that military action to eliminate terrorist organizations is the most appropriate tool to fight terrorism ranging from 34% of respondents in Poland and Portugal to 54% of Italians and 58% of Germans. *See Chart 15.*

EUROPEANS DIVIDED OVER USING FORCE ON SPECIFIC THREATS.

Europeans show similar and high degrees of support for using military force in different scenarios. But divisions emerge over using military forces to stop the fighting in a civil war (support ranges from 41% in Germany to 70% in Spain), ensure the supply of oil (opposition ranges from 27% in Portugal to 61% in Germany), and remove a government that abuses human rights (support ranges from 36% in Germany to 63% in Portugal).




Chart 14




Chart 15

No franco-germany unity over U.S. leadership, EU superpower, use of force.

Although France and Germany show more consensus than divergence on most questions, with opinions in both countries having grown closer over the past few years, French and German attitudes on questions relating to the nature of power, the use of force, and the future of Europe remain far apart. These questions highlight important differences over what kind of a global role French and German citizens want the European Union to play. *See Charts 16 and 17.*

Slovakia: a special European case.

Slovakia demonstrates a high degree of insularity in relation to other European countries. Relatively low percentages of Slovaks support taking an active role in world affairs (59%) and see NATO as essential (47%). Slovaks are more willing to bypass the UN on matters of vital interest (55%), less inclined to support strong U.S. leadership in the world (21%), and more likely to believe no country should be a superpower (57%). Slovaks are significantly less likely to support using military force (43% to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, 50% to defend a NATO ally). Whether public opinion in Slovakia, newly admitted to NATO and the EU, will begin to converge with broader European opinion remains to be seen.




Chart 16




Chart 17

No European consensus, considerable ambivalence over prospect of Turkey's EU membership.

Europeans show relatively little consensus over the possibility of Turkey's accession to the European Union, with support relatively low in France (16%) and Germany (26%) and relatively higher in Spain (39%) and Italy (45%). Many Europeans are ambivalent: a plurality (40%) believes Turkey's membership in the EU would be neither good nor bad, significantly higher than any other response. Although there is no European consensus on Turkey's membership in the EU, the lack of consensus and the fact that many Europeans apparently have not made up their minds create the prospect for a constructive debate in Europe over Turkey's future.

Turkish Exceptionalism?

Turkey was included for the first time in this year's Transatlantic Trends survey as one of our European countries. We examined Turkey both as an individual case and as part of a broader European collective in order to compare Turkish attitudes with those on both sides of the Atlantic when it comes to the United States, the European Union, legitimacy, and the use of force. The high level of "don't know" responses provided by Turkish respondents, especially on questions relating to the U.S.-European relationship, suggest that the Turkish public is unsure about what kind of a role it would like Turkey to play in the transatlantic alliance. On these questions, and many others, Turkey stands out as a unique case.

Turkish respondents do not have warm feelings for either Europe or U.S.

The Turkish public does not have especially warm feelings toward either the European Union or key European countries. The Turkish thermometer reading for the EU is 52 degrees, compared with an American reading toward the EU of 62 degrees and a European average of 70 degrees. While Turkish respondents give the U.S. a thermometer reading of only 28 degrees, the lowest thermometer reading for a NATO ally, France is not far behind in Turkish opinion with a reading of 34 degrees. Turkish respondents give Germany a thermometer reading of 46 degrees.

Turkish respondents hold deep reservations about U.S. leadership and policy.

While Turkey has long been considered a staunch pro-American ally, there are significant reservations in the Turkish public today regarding American leadership on international issues. Forty-seven percent of the Turkish public finds U.S. leadership "very undesirable"—the highest number recorded in this survey. When it comes to Iraq, 91% of Turkish respondents did not think the war was worth the loss of life and other costs.

Turkish skepticism toward U.S. leadership and policies does not translate into support for an EU security alternative.

The Turkish public does not seem to view the EU as a foreign policy or security alternative and remains ambivalent about the EU assuming a global security role. Only 40% of Turks believe the EU should become a superpower like the United States—compared with the European average of 71%. An equal percentage of Turkish respondents (40%) do not believe any country should be a superpower. Of those respondents who support the EU becoming a superpower, only 33% of them believe that the EU should compete more effectively with the United States.

Turkish respondents strongly support EU membership, see economic benefit.

There is strong support in Turkey for joining the EU. Seventy-three percent of Turkish citizens polled believe it would be a good thing for Turkey to join the EU—compared to the European average of 30%. The motivation behind such support in the Turkish public's mind appears to be largely economic: 70% identified the benefit to Turkey's economy that EU membership would provide as the main reason for their support.

Turkish public supports self-reliance.

The Turkish public is also less concerned about the support of allies and the legitimacy of international mandates when it comes to the question of using force, reflecting the country's strong tradition of self-reliance and the need to act alone if necessary to defend its national interests. On several of these questions, the Turkish public is, if anything, more "unilateral" than not only European public sentiments but those of the United States as well. *See Charts 18, 19, and 20.*




Chart 18




Chart 19




Chart 20

Turkish public support for use of military force much higher than in other European countries.

Like their other European counterparts, the Turkish public believes that economic power is more important in world affairs than military power. At the same time, 59% of Turks agree that the best way to ensure peace is through military strength (Europe 28%, U.S. 54%), and 50% of Turks believe that war is necessary to obtain justice under some conditions (Europe 41%, U.S. 82%). On many of these questions, the Turkish public finds itself somewhere between the U.S. and European public views.

When it comes to the prospect of using force, the Turkish public is significantly more supportive of using military force than either Europeans or Americans to stop the fighting in a civil war, ensure the supply of oil, and remove a government that abuses human rights. Seventy-four percent of Turks believe military action to eliminate terrorist organizations is the most appropriate way to fight terrorism. Levels of public support are similar to those in Europe and the United States in other scenarios. *See Chart 21.*




Chart 21




Chart 21 (continued)

*America Divided**

Americans strongly support taking an active part in world affairs but are as divided as Europeans on a range of issues, including the EU's role in the world, the war in Iraq, and the legitimacy of using military force without an international mandate. The polarization of the American public is striking, but not surprising given that this survey coincided with a U.S. presidential campaign. Historically, domestic opinion in any country is far more polarized during an election year. In many cases across this survey, Democratic opinion in the United States tracks closely with European public opinion and even surpasses it. However, it is important to emphasize that only 32% of survey respondents identified themselves as Democrats, while 32% were Republicans and 25% Independents. Whoever wins the election in November will have to face a country in which there are significant divisions in the public and in Congress concerning major questions of foreign policy.

Democrats and Independents more enthusiastic about strong EU leadership and closer U.S.–EU partnership.

All parties support strong EU leadership in world affairs (D 82%, R 72%, I 81%), but Democrats and Independents believe with greater intensity that EU leadership is very desirable (D 38%, R 27%, I 36%). Sixty-seven percent of Democrats, 48% of Republicans, and 54% of Independents believe that the partnership between the U.S. and the EU should become closer, but 29% of Republicans believe the U.S. should take a more independent approach.

* Data in this chapter is weighted according to know demographic characteristics of the U.S. population, including age, sex, education, and race.

Republicans want U.S. to remain the sole superpower.

Asked whether the United States should remain the only superpower or the EU should become a superpower like the U.S., 52% of Republicans responded that the United States should remain the only superpower, while 46% of Democrats and 40% of Independents responded that the EU should become a superpower like the U.S. Eighty-one percent of Democrats and 79% of Independents who support an EU superpower would continue to favor it even if the EU sometimes opposed U.S. policies. *See Chart 22.*

Democrats more favorable toward EU and hold far warmer views of France than Republicans.

Democrats and Independents have warmer feelings towards the EU (65 and 64 degrees, respectively) than Republicans (57 degrees). Democrats feel far more favorably about France than Republicans: Democrats gave France a thermometer reading of 59 degrees, compared with a Republican reading of 40 (Independents gave France a rating of 53).

Americans divided over President Bush's international policies.

Sixty-one percent of Republicans and 20% of Independents approve very much of President Bush's international policies, while 62% of Democrats and 36% of




Chart 22

Independents disapprove very much. Overall, 85% of Republicans approve of the President's international policies, while 80% of Democrats disapprove and Independents are almost evenly divided (49% approve, while 47% disapprove).

REPUBLICANS SUPPORT IRAQ WAR, DEMOCRATS STRONGLY DISAGREE, INDEPENDENTS DIVIDED.

Asked whether the war in Iraq to liberate the Iraqi people was worth the loss of life and other costs of attacking Iraq, 79% of Republicans agree and 81% of Democrats disagree. Asked whether the military action in Iraq increased or decreased the threat of terrorism in the world, 69% of Democrats and 50% of Independents believe it has increased the threat, while 51% of Republicans and 16% of Independents believe it decreased the threat. *See Charts 23 and 24.*

REPUBLICANS AND INDEPENDENTS APPROVE OF U.S. TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.

Sixty-three percent of Democrats disapprove of the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq, whereas 83% of Republicans and 54% of Independents approve. Eighty-six percent of Republicans, 53% of Democrats, and 60% of Independents approve of the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

REPUBLICANS SAY UN, ALLIED MANDATE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR IRAQ-TYPE OPERATION IN FUTURE.

Sixty-nine percent of Republicans believe it is not essential to secure the approval of the UN before using force if a situation like Iraq arose in the future, compared with 81% of Democrats and 61% of Independents who




Chart 23




Chart 24

believe it is essential. Forty-eight percent of Republicans believe it is not essential to secure the approval of the main European allies before using force if a situation like Iraq arose in the future, compared with 77% of Democrats and 74% of Independents who believe it is essential. *See Chart 25.*

REPUBLICANS AND INDEPENDENTS FAVOR BYPASSING UN ON VITAL INTERESTS; NEARLY 3 IN 5 DEMOCRATS BELIEVE BYPASSING UN NEVER JUSTIFIED.

Eighty-four percent of Republicans and 59% of Independents believe it is justified to bypass the UN when U.S. vital interests are involved. Only 40% of Democrats agree that bypassing the UN is sometimes justi-




Chart 25

fied, while 54% believe it is never justified. Eighty-one percent of Democrats and 64% of Independents—but only 41% of Republicans—have a favorable view of the United Nations. *See Chart 26.*

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS DEEPLY DIVIDED OVER ROLE OF MILITARY POWER.

Asked whether, under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice, 66% of Republicans agree strongly, compared with 35% of Democrats and 47% of Independents. Asked whether the best way to ensure peace is through military strength, 73% of Republicans agree, compared with 48% of Democrats and 48% of Independents. Asked whether military action to eliminate terrorist organizations is the most appropriate way to fight terrorism, 86% of Republicans agree, compared with 52% of Democrats and 61% of Independents. *See Chart 27.*




Chart 26

Republicans more likely to vote based on foreign policy and terrorism, while Democrats and Independents more likely to vote based on economy and domestic issues.

Most Democrats and Independents, but only a minority of Republicans, plan to vote based on how a party handles economic policy and domestic issues (D 71%, R 45%, I 65%). A slight plurality of Republicans (47%), but considerably fewer Democrats and Independents, are likely to vote based on how a party handles terrorism (R 23%, D 7%, I 8%) and foreign and security policy (R 24%, D 13%, I 13%).




Chart 27

Conclusions

Overwhelming majorities of Americans and Europeans want their countries to play an active role in the world. Both believe the United States and Europe share enough values to cooperate on international problems. At the same time, America's desire to move closer to Europe, coupled with Europeans' desire to play a more independent, if undefined, role in a world they wish to see less dominated by American power, may signal a fundamental change in the nature of the transatlantic alliance.

While Americans and Europeans agree broadly on the threats they face, there is no transatlantic consensus on using force without multilateral approval. Unlike Americans, many Europeans are unwilling to act without an international mandate to defend vital interests, suggesting that the debate over the legitimacy of using military force was not peculiar to the Iraq war but is an enduring feature of transatlantic relations.

Opinion across Europe demonstrates considerable convergence on many issues. But Europeans are divided over U.S. leadership in the world and show little consensus on the nature of the EU superpower they aspire to build. Most fundamentally, members of the European Union show little unity on when and under what conditions to use military force, raising questions about when and how the EU will project military power in the future.

Turkey's accession to the European Union would change both Europe and Turkey. Turkey would bring a greater willingness to use force, a higher inclination to bypass the UN, greater skepticism of America's role in the world, and less support for an independent EU superpower. But the high rate of "don't know" answers among Turkish respondents in this survey suggests that Turkey's European identity remains a work in progress.

American opinion on many of these questions is polarized, perhaps due in part to the effects of the upcoming U.S. elections. Democrats appear to share a number of the same views toward legitimacy, the use of force, the future of the EU, and U.S. policies as many Europeans. Republicans and Independents support the deployment of American forces in Iraq, while Democrats oppose it. Like the many divisions within Europe on key questions, this "divided America" presents a challenge of leadership for the winner of the November election.

Notes