‘Estudios experimentales sobre incentivos en organizaciones’

David J. Cooper, Enrique Fatás Juberías.

The issue of organisational incentives is a central concern in economic analysis. This project looks at behaviour patterns in organisations with an incentive structure which suffer problems of coordination (when many productive processes are characterised by strong complementarities among the efforts of different members) and free riding (workers’ behaviour which springs from the conflict between individual effort and collective reward).

Its main objective is to ascertain which incentive system is best from the standpoint of company productivity. A second line of interest is to conduct a detailed study on the range of complementarities present in organisational environments. Given the difficulty of gathering field data for the study of organisational and corporate incentives, we will use the experimental economic method, characterised by its control and replicability. The control structure will allow different team formation processes to be compared, while replicability will enhance the quantitative force of the findings.