DIRECTOR
RESEARCH TEAM
Agustín Gil Sanz, Iñaki Vázquez Martínez, Joaquín Andaluz Funcia, María Navarro Paniagua y Juan Carlos Candeal Haro.
COLLABORATING INSTITUTIONS
DESCRIPTION
The tools used will include the collective models of cooperative negotiation used in games theory, and collective models of household labour supply of the Chiappori variety, which start from a determined sharing rule.
In the first case, the influence of intrafamily decisions on labour supply will be gauged from a dynamic study employing the ‘supergame’ technique, that is, a game repeated ad infinitum. The study will also make use of the so-called multilateral cooperation games which allow for different coalitions among members of a given household.
In the second, new Chiappori-style models will be constructed after introducing two distributive factors: the sex ratio (men/woman) and divorce legislation. The empirical treatment of these models will draw primarily on statistical data from the EU Household Panel for the years 1994-2000.